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NE OF THE difficult questions that arises in the ongoing pub-
lic debate on immigration is whether immigrants to the United
States represent an overall cost or benefit to the U.S. econ-
omy. The answer to this question centers in part on the ex-
tent to which immigrants contribute to the labor force,
compete for jobs with native workers and provide goods and
services that otherwise would not be produced. The answer also 
centers on the fiscal impact of immigration—the amount of taxes 
immigrants pay relative to the amount of government services they
receive.
This final article of a two-part series on immigration addresses
these issues, drawing on the research and ideas presented at “Immi-
gration and the Economy,” a conference sponsored by the El Paso
Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
1
Immigration’s Place in Population and Labor Force Growth 
The most basic impact of immigration in any country is on its pop-
ulation growth and, therefore, the size of its labor force. Assuming
current levels of immigration, a little more than half the growth in the
U.S. population between 1995 and 2025 will come from new immi-
grants and their descendants. Similarly, more than half of the growth







Hamper Tradepost-1995 immigrants and their descen-
dants.
2 Without immigration, however,
the U.S. labor force would begin to de-
cline after 2015 (Chart 1).
A 1997 Congressional Research Ser-
vice study on the education and skill
distribution of jobs for 1994–2005 esti-
mates that the highest job growth over
this 10-year period will occur in jobs
that have high-skill requirements (requir-
ing some postsecondary education at a
minimum). However, many occupations
with limited skill requirements—such as
personal service workers, cleaning and
building service occupations, and retail
sales clerks—will also show above-
average job growth. Thus, though the
economy in 2005 will demand growing
numbers of workers with high educa-
tion and skill levels (reflecting technol-
ogy’s increasing importance), about half
of all jobs available then will require
only a high school education or less.
3
A look at the skill profile of immi-
grants shows that immigrants will fill
employers’ projected labor needs. Im-
migrants to the United States are dis-
proportionately included in both some
very low-skilled occupations—waiters,
housekeepers, agricultural and textile
workers—and some very high-skilled
occupations—physicians, chemists, en-
gineers and physics professors. Also,
immigrants are represented in occupa-
tions that require little education but
much skill, such as tailors, dressmakers
and jewelers.
4 This is concomitant with
immigrants’ overrepresentation at both
ends of the education spectrum—rela-
tive to natives, more immigrants have
less than a high school education and
more have college degrees.
5 However,
because immigrants are more predomi-
nantly found at the low end of the 
education distribution, they are more
largely concentrated in the low-educa-
tion, low-skill occupations.
6
Because native workers are becoming
increasingly more educated,
7 they will be
commanding more of the high-skilled
positions in the labor market and con-
tinuously fewer of the low-skilled posi-
tions. The skills of most immigrants are
suited to the low-skilled occupations, and,
therefore, immigrants can be expected
to fill this niche in the labor market.
Immigration’s Impact on U.S. Residents
Immigration creates both winners
and losers in the U.S. economy. Aside
from immigrants themselves, those who
gain from immigration are those who
complement immigrant labor—in gen-
eral, domestic high-skilled workers and
capital owners. Those who lose from
immigration are U.S. residents who
compete with immigrants for jobs, such
as less-skilled domestic workers with
low levels of education.
A comprehensive study on immigra-
tion by the National Research Council
(NRC) published last year describes im-
migration’s impact on different groups
of U.S. workers.
8 The study reports that
immigration during the 1980s increased
the labor supply of all workers by about
4 percent, thus reducing the wages of all
low-skilled native-born workers by about
1 percent to 2 percent. On the other hand,
wages for high-skilled workers rose,
given that immigrants, on net, represent
a source of increased demand for the
services of these high-skilled workers.
The NRC study reports that immi-
gration has caused a 15 percent in-
crease in the supply of workers with
less than a high school education. This
competition has reduced the wages of
this group of workers by about 5 per-
cent. Stated differently, between 1980
and 1994 about 44 percent of the total
decline in wages of workers with less
than a high school education was be-
cause of immigration. Fortunately, work-
ers in this category represent less than
10 percent of the U.S. workforce.
Though immigration would be ex-
pected to have a larger impact in geo-
graphic areas that receive large numbers
of immigrants, the NRC study reports 
an insignificant relationship between
native wages and the number of immi-
grants in a particular location. This rela-
tionship holds across all types of native
workers—skilled and unskilled, male
and female, minority and nonminority.
Thus, areas where immigrants are con-
centrated do not suffer disproportionate
losses when it comes to wages, even for
unskilled workers. According to the
NRC study, this suggests that native
workers either find other jobs with simi-
lar pay or move to other areas.
Interestingly, those who face the
greatest loss from immigration are prior
waves of immigrants, because newly 
arrived immigrants are their close sub-
stitutes. A 10 percent increase in the
supply of immigrants, for example, re-
duces the immigrant wage by at least 2
percent to 4 percent.
Aside from high-skilled native work-
ers, immigration’s winners also include
those who buy goods and services pro-
duced by immigrant labor. Moreover, to
the extent that some immigrants may
specialize in activities that otherwise
would not have existed domestically, all
consumers benefit from the availability
of new goods and services and their
lower prices.
In measuring the magnitude of immi-
gration’s overall impact on the U.S.
economy, the NRC study concludes that
“the most plausible magnitudes of the
impact of immigration on the economy
are modest for those who benefit from
immigration, for those who lose from
immigration, and for total GDP.” The
net gain for the economy may run be-
tween $1 billion and $10 billion a year,
which is a modest contribution in a $7.6
trillion economy but a positive and sig-
nificant one in absolute terms.
The Federal, State and Local
Fiscal Impacts of Immigration
The fiscal impact of immigration
varies across regions and different lev-
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NOTE: Medium immigration assumes 1,040,000 immi-
grants per year.
SOURCE: Jeffrey S. Passel and Barry Edmonston,
“Immigration and the Future American Work
Force,” The Urban Institute, 1998.els of government. Overall, immigrants
have been found to produce a net fiscal
gain (that is, they pay more in taxes
than they receive in services) at the fed-
eral level, but they impose a net burden
on the states and local communi-
ties where they are concentrated. Thus,
though immigrants do not represent a
fiscal burden to the nation as a whole,
high immigrant-receiving states such as
California, New York, Florida, Texas,
New Jersey and Illinois absorb a net 
fiscal cost from their immigrant popula-
tions.
9
A recent study of California—the
state with the nation’s largest concentra-
tion of immigrants—arrived at esti-
mates of the net fiscal cost immigrants
impose on the state for a given year. For
the 1994–95 fiscal year, it was estimated
that immigrant households incurred a
combined state and local negative fiscal
balance of $3,178 (in 1996 dollars) per
household. Native California house-
holds, on the other hand, recorded a
positive fiscal balance of $1,178 per
household.
10
Several characteristics of the average
immigrant-headed household as com-
pared with native households can ex-
plain why immigrants impose a net
fiscal burden (receive more in services
than they pay in taxes) on state and
local communities where immigrants
are concentrated: (1) immigrant-headed
households have more school-age chil-
dren than native households and 
therefore consume more educational
services; (2) the education provided to
immigrants at times is more expensive
because of additional bilingual educa-
tion classes that may be incorporated
into the system specifically for them;
11
(3) immigrant-headed households have
lower incomes (Chart 2) and own less
property than native households, and
hence their state and local tax payments
are lower; and (4) immigrant-headed
households are poorer than native
households and thus qualify for more
income transfers, even at the state and
local levels.
12
Although state and local communi-
ties “lose” from immigration when the
fiscal impact of immigrant households is
considered for a given year, annual 
estimates do not capture the full fiscal
impact of immigration for the following
reasons. First, annual estimates repre-
sent only one year’s taxes and one
year’s expenditures, whereas immigra-
tion is a dynamic process. Immigrants’
incomes, and therefore tax payments,
tend to rise with time in the United
States, while their use of social services
declines. (Once immigrants age and re-
tire, however, they, like natives, will use
more in services than they pay in
taxes.) Second, annual estimates in-
clude those U.S.-born children of immi-
grants who remain in their parents’
households during their school-age
years, when they represent a cost to the
system, yet exclude them (because they
are treated as natives) once they are of
working age, have moved out of the 
immigrant household and become con-
tributors to the system.
13
Immigrant Welfare Use
Another factor used to gauge whether
immigration is good or bad for the
economy is the incidence of welfare use
among immigrants. Welfare participa-
tion rates among immigrants from 1970
through 1990 reveal a rising trend. As
Chart 3 illustrates, the welfare participa-
tion rate among immigrants rose from
5.9 percent in 1970 to 9.1 percent in
1990. Moreover, while welfare partici-
pation rates were virtually identical
among immigrants and natives in 1970
(at 6 percent), immigrants’ use of wel-
fare in 1990 had surpassed the rate of
natives by almost 2 percentage points.
14
The lower incomes of immigrants rela-
tive to natives explains this trend. How-
ever, distinguishing among immigrant
types is also important.
Studies show that welfare use among
immigrants is mostly concentrated among
refugees—who are automatically enti-
tled to welfare assistance upon their 
arrival in the United States—and the 
elderly.
15 Duration of residence and age
also impact welfare use among immi-
grants. As Chart 4 shows, when these
factors are taken into account, working-
age nonrefugee immigrants are less
likely than natives to receive welfare.
Working-age refugees, on the other
hand, have a much higher welfare par-
ticipation rate.
16
As Chart 4 also shows, elderly immi-
grants have higher rates of welfare par-
ticipation than natives. Welfare use among
recently arrived elderly immigrants is very
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  3
Chart 2
Immigrant-Headed Households
Generally Have Lower Income

































SOURCE: George Borjas, Harvard University, from
remarks presented at the economic forum




Refugees and the Elderly

















SOURCE: The Urban Institute.grants arriving in their late 60s impose a
fiscal burden. Yet, because most immi-
grants arrive at working ages, the long-
term net fiscal impact of immigrants as
a whole is usually positive.
22
Education also bears on the long-term
fiscal impact of immigrants. As would be
expected, the more education an immi-
grant embodies, the more positive his or
her long-term fiscal impact on the econ-
omy. For example, estimates show that
immigrants with less than a high school
education impose a long-term fiscal
burden, while immigrants with a high
school education or more contribute a
substantial fiscal gain (Chart 5).
Comparing immigrants and natives in
their participation in public programs
also yields interesting long-term conclu-
sions. For programs such as Social Se-
curity and Medicare, immigrants receive
proportionately lower benefits than na-
tives do. For programs such as SSI, Aid
to Families with Dependent Children
and food stamps, immigrants receive
proportionately more. When the cost of
all programs is combined, there is little
difference between immigrants and na-
tives. And although immigrants are cost-
lier during childhood than natives (if the
cost of bilingual education is assumed),
they tend to be less expensive than 
natives in old age. These differences,
over a lifetime, tend to balance out.
Finally, though a long-run assessment
of immigration’s fiscal impact yields a
strongly positive picture at the federal
level, the impact at the state and local
levels remains negative. Yet, while the
positive federal impact is shared evenly
across the nation, the negative state and
local impacts apply only to the few loca-
tions that receive the most immigrants.
Conclusion
Sizing up immigration’s overall im-
pact on the economy is not a straight-
forward process, given the many factors
at play, some of which cannot be easily
measured. Immigration is often only
evaluated in the context of its fiscal im-
plications for the economy or through
the impact immigrants exert on the em-
ployment and wages of low-skilled 
native workers. Factors often left out of
the analysis of whether immigrants pro-
vide a net gain or loss to the economy
include the increase in consumption
generated by immigrant spending, the
tax contributions and job creation (and
associated employment tax streams) of
immigrant-owned businesses,
23 the im-
pact on productivity of highly skilled
immigrants and even the impact of 
immigrants on urban renewal and its 
associated fiscal implications.
24
The evidence suggests that immi-
grants produce a fiscal gain for the 
nation as a whole but impose a burden
on those states and communities where
they are concentrated. This is the case
whether immigrant costs and benefits
are evaluated in a single year or over
the long run. However, over a lifetime,
immigrants’ fiscal impact at the federal
level is much more positive than annual
estimates show. Studies also conclude
that while most immigrants complement
the higher skilled labor force, they im-
pose downward pressure on the wages
of the lower skilled. Finally, immigrants
play an important role in the continued
growth of the labor force. Although im-
migration’s distributional effects may 
be nontrivial, the overall effects of im-
migration are relatively small and are
dwarfed by many other, more signifi-
cant factors (such as national saving
and investment rates) that more directly
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high, at 27.3 percent for nonrefugees
and 46.6 percent for refugees. This con-
trasts dramatically with the 3.5 percent
welfare participation rate of elderly na-
tives. Such high welfare use by elderly
immigrants—particularly in the form of
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—
suggests that welfare for this group not
only provides income but also access to
medical care through Medicaid since
many of these immigrants are not eligi-
ble for Social Security and Medicare.
Thus, SSI use among elderly immigrants
may be a substitute for Social Security
and Medicare.
17 Conversely, welfare par-
ticipation among elderly natives may 
be low because this group does have
access to Social Security and Medicare
and therefore is less likely to need 
additional assistance through supple-
mentary programs.
18
Welfare and immigration laws passed
in 1996 should ameliorate the use of wel-
fare among (nonrefugee) immigrants,
because the new regulations basically
bar immigrants from receiving federal
welfare until attaining citizenship, which
occurs about seven years after arrival.
Also, the law now imposes income 
requirements for sponsors of immi-
grants,
19 and the sponsors’ obligation to
support immigrants is made legally en-
forceable.
20 For example, sponsors peti-
tioning an immigrant—whether a family
member or prospective employee—must
prove income equal to 125 percent of
the poverty line.
21
Long-Term Measures of Fiscal Impact
As mentioned above, annual esti-
mates of the fiscal impact of immigrants
do not capture the full picture of immi-
gration’s effect on public finance. Long-
term measures of immigration’s impact
consider several factors that are absent
in the annual estimates. One factor that
matters, for example, is the age of the
immigrant upon arrival in the United
States. Immigrants (like natives) are
costly during childhood and old age but
are net taxpayers during their working
years. Thus, the long-term fiscal impact
of an immigrant varies by the age of 
arrival. Immigrants arriving at ages 10 to
25 usually represent a net long-term 
fiscal benefit to natives, while immi-
Chart 5
Better Educated Immigrants
Have Positive Fiscal Impact
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SOURCE: The New Americans: Economic, Demographic,
and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, National
Research Council, 1997.
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NVESTORS HAVE LONG recog-
nized the protection that indexed
debt contracts offer against unex-
pected inflation, eliminating the
capricious transfers from lenders
to borrowers. The inflation-tax
problem is a special concern when the
government is the borrower; in this set-
ting, inflation is under the debtor’s
purview. In addition, some economists
argue that there is useful information
contained in the yields of non-indexed
and indexed government bonds. The
difference in the two yields is a market-
based signal of expected inflation. Cen-
tral bankers could use the yield spread
as an indicator of monetary policy.
1
In February 1997, the U.S. Treasury
began auctioning Treasury Inflation Pro-
tection Securities, or TIPS. U.S. Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin explained that
TIPS would index both the semiannual
coupon payments and the security’s
face value to movements in the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI).
To illustrate how indexation works,
Table 1 presents a hypothetical example
in which a pair of 2-year securities are
auctioned: one is a TIPS and the other
is a non-indexed security. Both securi-
ties sell for $1,000. Suppose the coupon
rate on the TIPS is 4 percent.
2 Assume
that buyers have perfect foresight,
knowing that the inflation rate will be
constant and equal to 6 percent for the
next two years. The buyer is indifferent
between the two securities, provided
the coupon rate on the non-indexed
Treasury security is 10.03 percent.
3 Note
that the coupon rate for the non-
indexed security is a combination of the
real return and the expected inflation
rate. Every six months, the TIPS’ face
value is recomputed to take into ac-
count price-level increases. In Table 1,
the face value of the TIPS is updated to
take the price increases into account.
Formally, the TIPS’ face value is calcu-
lated as the product of the initial face
value and the ratio of the current CPI to
the CPI’s value when the security was 
issued. The semiannual coupon payment
is then one-half the coupon rate times
the most recent face value. In contrast,
neither the semiannual coupon pay-
ment nor the face value changes for 
the non-indexed security. As Table 1
shows, the person holding the non-
indexed bond receives a larger semi-
annual coupon payment than the one
holding the TIPS, but at the cost of
eroding purchasing power.
4
The purpose of this article is to grade
TIPS’ performance. In 1997 and 1998,
the inflation rate has been relatively low.
While low inflation is desirable for many
reasons, it renders less meaningful the
distinction between indexed and non-
indexed government debt. Low inflation
notwithstanding, TIPS are judged by two
criteria. First, do indexed government
bonds make people better off? Recent
research indicates the answer is yes, but
the gain is small. Second, has yield
spread served as a useful indicator? The
U.S. Treasury has been auctioning a rela-
tively small quantity of TIPS, and these
have maturity dates exceeding five
years. Arguably, this term is not short
enough for the central bank, which 
focuses on horizons up to two years. In
sum, the TIPS’ “grade” is “incomplete.”
The Economics of Indexation
In the example above, the bond-
holder ensures against the erosion of
purchasing power over time by bidding
up the coupon rate on the non-indexed
security. The higher coupon payment 
is necessary to compensate the bond-
holder for receiving such payments in
cheaper dollars. Indeed, the bond-
holder is indifferent between holding
the non-indexed security and the TIPS
because the present values of goods
and services are equal.
5 Economist Irv-
ing Fisher (1911) recognized this, stat-
ing the coupon rate on the non-indexed
Treasury security will be equal to
(1 + p)(1 + r) – 1,
where p is the inflation rate and r is the
real return.
The hypothetical example, however,





Consider two U.S. Treasury securities, each selling for $1,000 at initial auction on January 1,
1998. Suppose Bond A is a non-indexed security and the other a TIPS. Further, suppose the
CPI increases at a 6 percent annual rate known with certainty at the time of the auction. Both
bonds mature in two years.
Bond A TIPS
Coupon Coupon
Face value payment Face value payment
July 1, 1998 $1,000 $50.15 $1,029.56 $20.59
Jan. 1, 1999 $1,000 $50.15 $1,060.00 $21.20
July 1, 1999 $1,000 $50.15 $1,091.34 $21.83
Jan. 1, 2000 $1,000 $50.15 $1,123.60 $22.47
(at redemption)
NOTE: To compute the coupon payments for the non-indexed bond, the following formula is used:
c/2*FV, where c is the coupon rate on the non-indexed bond and FV denotes its face value.tant way: The future price level cannot
be known with certainty; it can only be
estimated. Thus, an unavoidable risk is
inherent to the non-indexed security.
Consider the example in Table 1, modi-
fied so the average inflation rate is 6
percent over the security’s two-year life.
Suppose the bondholder is risk neutral,
caring only about the average return.
With a risk-neutral bondholder, the
coupon rate on the non-indexed secu-
rity will be 10.03 percent, same as in the
perfect-foresight scenario. Suppose,
however, that the bondholder is risk
averse, disliking uncertainty. In this
case, a coupon rate greater than 10.03
percent is necessary to entice the risk-
averse person to hold the non-indexed
security. The risk-averse person must be
compensated for expected inflation,
plus receive a risk premium to compen-
sate for uncertain price-level move-
ments over the next two years. Hence,
the coupon rate will consist of three
parts: the real return, the expected in-
flation rate and the risk premium.
The Gains from TIPS
To see why economists believe that
the existence of TIPS will make people
better off, it is necessary to take the
government’s income and expense
statement into account. Indeed, the risk
premium plays an important role in
government finance and, hence, in
identifying the gains from introducing
indexed government bonds.
In a simple view, the U.S. Treasury’s
expenses consist of goods and services
and debt payments, both paying inter-
est and redeeming securities that have
matured. Income is earned from taxes,
new bond sales and money creation.
The argument hinges on the interest
payments with TIPS versus non-indexed
government debt. The U.S. Treasury’s
interest payments, on average, will be
lower with a TIPS than with a non-
indexed Treasury security.
6 Provided
these savings are passed on in the form
of lower taxes, the typical person will
be better off.
For instance, suppose the U.S. Treas-
ury auctions one TIPS and one non-
indexed security, both maturing in one
year. Following the hypothetical exam-
ple, suppose the TIPS offers a 4 percent
coupon rate while the non-indexed
Treasury security offers a 12 percent
coupon rate. Further, suppose that the
realized inflation rate is 6 percent, equal
to what people expected when the 
security was sold. Note that a risk-
neutral bondholder would accept a
coupon rate of 10.03 percent. Hence,
the risk premium is 1.97 percent. (The
sole difference in government’s real in-
terest expenses is due to risk aversion.)
Compare real interest expenses with
TIPS and with the non-indexed security.
Because the coupon rate on the non-in-
dexed bond is greater than the sum of
the coupon payment and the actual in-
flation rate, the government’s real inter-
est expenses are lower with the TIPS
than with the non-indexed security. Next,
suppose that the lower real interest ex-
penses translate to a cut in taxes. For 
a given level of income, the typical 
risk-averse citizen will be better off be-
cause the tax cut means the person can
acquire either more consumer goods or
more capital.
The bottom line is that an inflation-
indexed security creates a market for 
inflation insurance. Without the pres-
ence of TIPS, for example, inflation in-
surance works if the person accurately
forecasted inflation. With TIPS, forecast
accuracy is no longer needed. The addi-
tional market means that another good
can be traded, improving consumer sat-
isfaction.
7
A government offering TIPS would
have less incentive to use the inflation
tax. Note that all non-indexed govern-
ment paper is subject to the inflation tax.
At the end of 1997, the United States
had nearly $6 trillion of non-indexed
government paper—U.S. Treasury se-
curities plus base money—outstanding.
U.S. Treasury securities accounted for
more than 90 percent—$5.5 trillion—
of that quantity. Suppose the U.S. Treas-
ury replaced all the non-indexed gov-
ernment securities with TIPS. The tax
base would shrink to about $500 bil-
lion. Correspondingly, the amount of
money raised by a given increase in the
inflation rate would decline. After tak-
ing into account the costs associated
with higher inflation, the smaller payoff
means there is less incentive to use in-
flation to raise government revenue.
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insurance.TIPS Role as Expected 
Inflation Indicator
Should the U.S. substitute TIPS for all
the non-indexed government securities
outstanding? Although there is practi-
cally no threat of this happening, the
answer is no. The coexistence of TIPS
and non-indexed Treasury securities
creates a potential indicator for central
bankers.
The value of the potential indicator
stems from the difference in yields on
non-indexed securities and TIPS. Recall
that the difference between the rates on
these two securities is the expected in-
flation rate and the risk premium. Het-
zel (1991) argued that central bankers
would like an indicator of the inflation
expectations. Subtract the yield on TIPS
from the yield on a non-indexed Treas-
ury security, controlling for maturity, to
obtain a market-based signal of ex-
pected inflation rate. Unfortunately, the
yield differential is a noisy signal; there
is no definitive way to identify what
part of the yield differential is the ex-
pected inflation rate and what part is
the risk premium. Still, movements in
the yield differential represent an im-
provement compared with what policy-
makers currently have—survey data
that are not subject to any market-
performance criterion. Hence, econo-
mists recommend that indexed and
non-indexed securities coexist.
It is time to look at how TIPS have
performed.
TIPS: A Brief History
On February 6, 1997, the U.S. Treas-
ury introduced 10-year TIPS notes.
8 In
July 1997, the Treasury auctioned 5-year
TIPS notes for the first time, followed
by an auction of 30-year TIPS bonds in
April 1998. Plans have been announced
to auction 2-year TIPS notes and infla-
tion-protected savings bonds. Overall,
the Treasury has offered TIPS at six sep-
arate auctions, including two dates in
1998.
Table 2 displays the dates on which
5-, 10- and 30-year securities were auc-
tioned and the value of securities auc-
tioned on those dates. Since 1997, the
Treasury has auctioned 5- or 10-year
notes on 28 occasions. TIPS were auc-
tioned on five of those dates: 5-year
notes twice and 10-year notes on three
occasions. Of the past four auctions at
which 30-year bonds were sold, in-
dexed bonds were sold only once.
9
Not only are the TIPS auctions rela-
tively infrequent, but, on a maturity-by-
maturity basis, the Treasury sells fewer
TIPS at auction than it does non-
indexed securities. Cumulatively, in
1997 the Treasury auctioned slightly
more than $16 billion worth of 5-year
indexed notes, slightly more than $15
billion worth of  10-year indexed notes
and $8 billion worth of 30-year indexed
bonds. Over the same period, the Treas-
ury auctioned more than $201 billion
worth of 5-year non-indexed notes,
more than $63 billion worth of 10-year
non-indexed notes and more than $22
billion worth of 30-year non-indexed
Treasury bonds. The size of a TIPS 
auction was roughly 75 percent the size
of auctions for non-indexed Treasury
securities. On a cumulative basis, TIPS
accounted for less than 14 percent of
the total amount of 5-, 10- and 30-year
securities auctioned during the past 18
months.
Based on Table 2, three facts stand
out. First, TIPS auctions are held less
frequently than auctions at which non-
indexed securities are sold. Second, the
quantity of TIPS auctioned is smaller
than the quantity of non-indexed gov-
ernment securities being auctioned.
Third, and perhaps most telling, TIPS
were never auctioned on the same day
as non-indexed securities.
Together, these facts suggest some-
thing about the economic value of in-
dexation. The evidence intimates that
the U.S. Treasury was attempting to 
protect TIPS in their infancy. This claim
begs the following question: Why
would the TIPS market need protection?
One answer is that the gains from
TIPS are quantitatively small, as Viard
(1993) found. If the gains are small, a
typical bondholder is virtually indiffer-
ent between the two securities. Such an
attitude could inhibit the development
of a market for TIPS, potentially lead-
ing to undersubscribed auctions for
TIPS. Such indifference is observation-
ally equivalent to the notion that the
Treasury was protecting TIPS. Small
gains may also account for why only
five countries—Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Great Britain and the United
States—issue indexed bonds.
Assessing the 
Information Value of TIPS
The other criterion for grading TIPS
is the value of the information present
in the yield spread between indexed
and non-indexed securities. The yields
for 5-year and 10-year U.S. Treasury se-
curities are plotted in Charts 1 and 2, re-







































NOTE: (I) denotes an auction of TIPS.of the two streams of dollar payments are identical. The arbitrage
condition is formally represented as
where FV denotes the face value of the security, c
T is the coupon rate
on the TIPS, d is the discount rate applied against future payments,
c is the coupon rate on the non-indexed security and p is the infla-
tion rate. The left side of the expression is the real present value of
payments from the TIPS, and the right side is the real present value
of payments from the non-indexed bond. Note that payments from
the TIPS security are indexed by (1 + p). Hence, deflating by (1 + p)
and indexing by (1 + p) result in this term canceling out on the left
side of the arbitrage condition.
4 In practice, the CPI value used is called the reference value. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics does not publish CPI values each day. To
get around this, the Treasury chooses a reference value that lags the
issue date by 2.5 months. The Treasury computes the reference value
as a weighted sum, where the weight corresponds to the time of the
month when the security is issued. For example, a note issued on
January 15 will have reference date CPI equal to 16/31 times April’s
CPI value plus 15/31 times May’s CPI. The first coupon payment is
due July 15. The reference value for that date is 16/31 times Octo-
ber’s CPI plus 15/31 times November’s CPI. Then, 1 + p in footnote
3 is calculated as the ratio of July 15’s reference value to January
15’s reference value.
5 With coupon payments and with inflation that varies over time, it is
more difficult to ensure against inflation.
6 Note here that the par value of government securities is held fixed.
7 This article ignores the risk associated with holding periods that 
differ from the securities’ time to maturity. See Shen (1998) for a dis-
cussion of market risk as it applies to the TIPS and non-indexed
Treasury securities.
8 This is not to say that the February 1997 auction was the first time
that indexed bonds were auctioned in the United States. See Viard
(1993) for a complete history of indexed bonds in the United States.
9 Some of the TIPS auctions were reopened. The U.S. Treasury often
reopens some issues when bids are insufficient to sell all the notes
or bonds.
10 There is not enough data on the yields for the 30-year securities to
merit a separate figure.
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10 In each chart, the yield is
plotted for both a non-indexed security
and a TIPS. Note that the spread be-
tween the two alternative securities has
narrowed slightly since the inception of
TIPS. More precisely, the spread on 10-
year notes declined slightly more than
100 basis points, while the spread on 5-
year notes fell about 70 basis points.
Before it can be claimed that ex-
pected inflation has fallen about 0.75
percentage point, two problems emerge.
One is the basic identification issue.
There is no way of knowing how much
of the decline in the yield spread is due
to falling expected inflation rate and
how much to falling risk premium. A
much more accurate, but far weaker,
statement is that 1998 data are consis-
tent with some decline in the expected
inflation rate compared with early 1997.
The second problem is that the U.S.
Treasury auctioned 5- and 10-year notes.
Even if the identification problem were
eliminated, the data relate to the aver-
age expected inflation rate over the next
five years, which may not be that use-
ful for central bankers. If the planning 
horizon is two years, movement in the
average expected inflation rate over the
next five years is not the most useful in-
dicator to the central banker. Until TIPS
with shorter maturities are sold, the cen-
tral banker is left waiting until the time
left on outstanding TIPS matches with
the central bankers’ planning horizon.
Concluding Remarks
So what grade does TIPS deserve? An
“incomplete” seems appropriate at this
stage. The early evidence supports the
claim that people do benefit, albeit not
greatly, from indexed bonds. This is es-
pecially true in a low-inflation environ-
ment, like the one the United States has
enjoyed over the past couple of years.
Unfortunately, the expected inflation
rate that could possibly be inferred from
TIPS and non-indexed securities does
not provide the information most useful
to the Federal Reserve. It is noteworthy
that the “Monetary Policy Report to the
Congress” (Federal Reserve Board, 1998)
did not refer to the yield differential be-
tween TIPS and non-indexed Treasury
securities when it discussed the infla-
tion outlook for 1998 and 1999. When
shorter maturities, such as the 2-year
TIPS, are offered, it will be easier to
judge whether Federal Reserve officials




1 This argument is articulated in a Wall Street Journal op-ed article by
Robert Hetzel (1991).
2 The coupon rate is computed as a year’s worth of interest payments
divided by the bond’s face value. At auctions, bids are ranked from
the lowest coupon rate to the highest. Those offering the lowest
coupon rates are awarded the securities. The Treasury accepts bids
so that the security’s price ranges from 99.875 percent to 100.125
percent of its face value.
3 Here, indifference requires that the inflation-adjusted present values
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sAST ISSUES OF Southwest Econ-
omy have highlighted the posi-
tive impacts of free trade and
the long-term potential benefits
of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). But
free trade that exists only in theory
helps no one. In reality many road-
blocks other than tariffs can hamper the
flow of goods and services across bor-
ders. For example, physical and struc-
tural problems at the Texas–Mexican
border can impede the flow of goods
and thus reduce the benefits of NAFTA.
Laredo is the busiest land port along
the U.S.–Mexican border, representing
37 percent of the value of all traded
goods shipped by land in 1997 and
about one-third of total U.S.–Mexican
trade. Last year $50.5 billion in goods
flowed north and south through the
Laredo area, a 71 percent increase since
1994. Most of the goods were carried 
by 2.2 million trucks crossing on the
Lincoln-Juarez Bridge in downtown
Laredo and the Solidarity Bridge 20
miles to the north. While trade flow has
boomed in this border port, so has con-
gestion. Trucks lined up for miles head-
ing both north and south are a common
sight at the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge.
While rapid growth is partly respon-
sible for the bottleneck, another cause
is that Mexican customs agents preclear
all truck cargo before it crosses into
Mexico. U.S. long-haul carriers drop
their cargo in Laredo, where Mexican
customs brokers inspect the cargo, col-
lect duties and arrange for other trucks
to transport the load across the bridge.
These trucks then return to the U.S.
side, usually empty. Similarly, Mexican
carriers usually deliver their cargo to
Mexican customs on the Mexican side
of the border. Another truck carries the
load across to Laredo and then returns,
often empty. As a result of this system,
about 44 percent of the tractors crossing
the bridge in 1997 had no trailer or 
an empty one. Reducing the number of
empty trucks would have a significant
impact on border congestion.
Under NAFTA both north- and south-
bound trucks should have been able to
drive into border states beginning in
December 1995 and throughout both
countries by the year 2000. President
Clinton, however, responding to per-
ceived safety issues, delayed this pro-
vision indefinitely. Implementing the
provision would pressure Mexican cus-
toms brokers to stop inspecting U.S.
cargo on the U.S. side of the border 
because many major U.S. manufacturers
likely would seek direct shipment into
important industrial areas such as Mon-
terrey. Researchers at Texas A&M Inter-
national University (TAMIU) in Laredo
estimate that in 1995 the big three U.S.
automakers spent $2.8 million more
shipping products southbound through
Laredo than they would have if the
NAFTA provision had taken hold and
precertification of goods was no longer
required.
1
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troads also cause delays at the border.
U.S. customs is open from 8 a.m. to
midnight, while Mexican customs is
open from 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. The agency
that inspects agricultural products going
into Mexico—Secretaría de Agricultura,
Ganadería y Desarrollo Rural (SAGAR)—
opens at 10 a.m. and closes at 5 p.m.
Trucks carrying agricultural products into
Mexico must first go through SAGAR 
inspection and then get in line to go
through Mexican customs. Round-the-
clock customs operations by all agencies
would reduce congestion in downtown
Laredo and increase bridge capacity.
Bridge crossing fees could be structured
to encourage use at off-peak times.
The state-of-the-art Solidarity Bridge
was completed in 1991 but has just re-
cently begun to relieve some of the
truck congestion in Laredo and Nuevo
Laredo. The bridge, however, continues
to operate well below capacity. One
reason is the poor condition of the con-
necting road in Mexico, which is only 8
feet wide and has no shoulders. On the
U.S. side, the road connecting to Inter-
state 35 passes through busy residential
areas. Improvements to roads on the
Mexican side are in process, however,
and a road connecting the bridge to a
new Monterrey toll highway should be
completed in a couple of years.
Enhanced drug enforcement activi-
ties have also added to the time and ex-
pense of border crossings. To increase
traffic flow, U.S. Customs is looking to-
ward technological and innovative re-
sources. X-ray machines that can check
an entire truckload for contraband in 20
minutes have been installed at four bor-
der ports, and four more machines are
planned for installation in the next year.
Other types of technology have sig-
nificant potential to reduce border 
congestion. The North American Trade
Automation Prototype (NATAP), now in
testing, would allow cargo at either the
point of origin or an inland port to be
electronically sealed, tracked and then
transported straight across the border.
Currently the system is installed at four
test sites: Otay Mesa, California; Nogales,
Arizona; El Paso and Laredo. For com-
plete implementation of the plan, how-
ever, current laws and agreements need
to be changed to allow trucks to cross
freely into border states.
One proposed solution to the con-
gestion is to build another bridge in
Laredo. But before millions more are
spent on a new bridge, the current in-
frastructure should be utilized to its
fullest extent. Almost 5,000 trucks cross
the two commercial bridges in the
Laredo region daily. If the empty trucks
were eliminated, the same amount of
goods could be transported in only
2,750 trucks. This is about one-fourth
the capacity of the Solidarity Bridge, 
according to James Giermanski of
TAMIU. Giermanski projects that, based
on the average growth rate of truck 
traffic over the past four years, it would
take until the year 2020 to reach the 
capacity of the Solidarity Bridge if all
loaded truck traffic in Laredo went
solely across that bridge.
In recent months the line of trucks
heading south through Laredo has ex-
tended back as far as 5 miles. The time
spent waiting to cross the border repre-
sents direct costs to shippers and to tax-
payers, who must pay for the roads.
There are also indirect costs such as in-
creased air pollution and the opportu-
nity costs of the resources that are idled.
Improved technology and better roads
should relieve some of the bottleneck.
While a new bridge would help consid-
erably, reducing the number of empty
trucks and extending operating hours




1 See “The Effects of the Drayage Industry on Trans-U.S.–Mexico
Truck Shipments through the Port of Laredo, Texas,” unpublished
paper by Henry C. Smith and James Giermanski.
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Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet Web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
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HE REGION’S ECONOMY continues to grow at a
healthy pace. Although employment growth was a 
robust 4.1 percent annual rate in July, quarterly
growth has been trending down since the fourth 
quarter of 1997, as can be seen in the chart below.
The Texas Leading Index declined in July for the third
month in a row. Most indicators were negative, as shown in
the Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading
Index chart.
Despite the health of the regional economy, some indus-
tries have weakened recently. The hot, dry weather is taking
its toll on the farming sector. The energy and high-tech in-
dustries continue to be weak, battered by low prices. High
supply and low demand have kept oil prices near $14 per bar-
rel, leading to declines in the rig count and layoffs in the oil
and gas extraction sector. The weakness in the high-tech in-
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI** Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
7/98 122.8 129.0 171.1  488.5 1,099.5  1,499.5  5,660.9  8,919.5  1,878.4  720.1 
6/98 123.4 129.2 171.7  486.8 1,101.0 1,494.9  5,635.6  8,890.0 1,876.0 718.7 
5/98 124.7 128.6 171.2  485.2 1,099.4  1,495.3  5,622.6  8,873.7  1,872.3  717.3 
4/98 124.8 128.6 171.6  482.8 1,098.5  1,495.3  5,605.5  8,853.7  1,869.8  716.1 
3/98 124.7 129.1 171.7  480.3 1,097.9  1,493.2  5,593.9  8,837.0 1,868.9  714.9 
2/98 125.0 128.9 172.4  478.1 1,096.4  1,489.8  5,579.2  8,815.9  1,862.6  714.1 
1/98 124.0 128.9 172.2  474.8 1,094.1  1,489.4  5,560.1  8,790.6  1,857.0 714.2 
12/97 123.2 128.8 171.4  470.3 1,096.6  1,488.1  5,541.8  8,768.2  1,854.9  712.8 
11/97 123.9 128.4 170.8  469.1 1,092.8  1,482.4  5,522.2  8,737.3  1,852.1  712.0
10/97 124.5 128.8 169.9  468.0 1,089.6  1,479.6  5,504.0 8,711.1  1,849.4  711.3 
9/97 124.6 127.9 168.9  465.7 1,087.9  1,475.1  5,478.3  8,675.9  1,845.4  708.5 
8/97 122.8 127.2 168.4  465.5 1,084.4  1,481.6  5,448.2  8,648.1  1,839.4  709.7
* in thousands
** Texas Industrial Production Index
dustry led to falling earnings in the second quarter for many
of the region’s high-tech companies and caused some layoffs.
The construction and service industries continue to show
strong growth. Construction industry activity was vigorous in
the second quarter, buoyed by residential building. Despite
much new construction, apartment occupancy rates are up 
in all major metro areas. The single-family housing market
also remains hot in all major metro areas. The Texas Housing
Price Index increased 4.6 percent in the first quarter (year
over year). Employment in the private service-producing 
sector (which makes up 63 percent of total Texas em-
ployment) increased 4.1 percent in July (annual rate), led 
by growth in trucking and warehousing, communications, 
finance, insurance and real estate, business services and trade.
—Mine K. Yücel
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United States had completed four years or more of college.
This figure was up from 17 percent in 1980.
8 Smith and Edmonston, pp. 5–7; 223, 225. Data presented
in the remainder of this section rely on the National Re-
search Council’s findings.
9 Passel, economic forum.
10 Smith and Edmonston, p. 281. A similar study for New Jer-
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13 Passel, economic forum.
14 George Borjas, Harvard University, outline of remarks pre-
sented at “Immigration and the Economy.”
15 Passel, economic forum. The Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service defines refugees as those persons seeking
asylum in the United States because they are unable or un-
willing to return to their country of origin because of per-
secution based on their race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opin-
ion. Overall, there are no limits on the number of refugee
immigrants allowed, though the president sets annual ceil-
ings by geographic area after consultations with Congress.
16 Passel, economic forum.
17 Passel, economic forum.
18 Many economists believe that, to a large extent, Social Se-
curity payments to the elderly represent a form of welfare
because current beneficiaries receive more in benefits than
they contributed to the system.
19 The majority of legal immigrants enter the United States
through a sponsor. Sponsors petition for entry of immi-
grants based on family or employment considerations. In
1996 nearly 78 percent of the immigrants who were admit-
ted to the United States were sponsored by family members
(65 percent) and employers (13 percent).
20 Passel, economic forum. The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the Welfare
Act) changed the welfare system and restricts the access 
of legal and illegal immigrants to a wide range of public
benefits. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 added to and amended sections
of the Welfare Act and includes stricter provisions on the 
financial status and financial responsibility of sponsors of 
immigrants. The legislation, however, gives states the 
option to provide or bar assistance to most qualified immi-
grants.
21 James L. Ward, U.S. Consul General, Ciudad Juárez, Chi-
huahua; outline of remarks presented at “Immigration and
the Economy.” The Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices defines the poverty level on an annual basis. In 1996
the poverty line for a family of four was $15,600. Thus, in
that year, an immigrant wishing to bring his wife and two
children to the United States had to show an annual income
of $19,500—an amount equal to125 percent of the poverty
level.
22 Smith and Edmonston, pp. 11–12. Data in the remainder 
of this section rely on the National Research Council’s find-
ings.
23 See Stephen Moore, A Fiscal Portrait of the Newest Ameri-
cans, National Immigration Forum and the Cato Institute,
July 1998, pp. 17–19.
24 Joel Millman, correspondent, Wall Street Journal, Mexico
City Bureau, outline of remarks presented at “Immigration
and the Economy.” Millman’s book, The Other Americans:
How Immigrants Renew Our Country, Our Economy, and
Our Values, includes a discussion of how some immi-
grants, by settling in previously abandoned inner-city areas,
have helped revive local economies.
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